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Abstract 
 
During the past two decades the European Union (EU) has increasingly come to be 
recognised as an important international actor in environmental politics. The failure of 
the EU to instigate an ambitious post-2012 environmental framework agreement at 
the Fifteenth Conference of the Parties (COP15) to the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in Copenhagen in 2009 may, however, 
signal a change in the EU’s status as an international climate change actor. It raises 
the question of which conditions allowed the EU to be an actor in the first place. 
Drawing on the theoretical concept of actorness, the paper analyses the conditions 
for EU actorness in the area of climate change. It will be argued that for the EU to be 
an actor, all four criteria of actorness – recognition, authority, cohesion and 
autonomy – need to be present. While these criteria were present at the 1992 Rio 
Summit and the COP3 in Kyoto in 1997, a lack of autonomy and cohesion prevented 
the EU from being an international actor in Copenhagen.  
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Introduction 
 
During the past two decades, the European Union (EU)1 has increasingly come to be 
recognised as an important actor in environmental politics (Groenleer & Van Schaik, 
2007, p. 971; Oberthür & Kelly, 2008, p. 47). The EU has been among the strongest 
supporters of the UNFCCC which provides the basis of international cooperation in 
the fight against climate change, in particular by setting out the ultimate objectives 
as well as the fundamental principles of international climate policy (Oberthür, n.d., p. 
1). During the negotiations on the establishment of the UNFCCC at the 1992 United 
Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio de Janeiro2, 
the EU called for binding obligations of industrialised countries to stabilise their carbon 
dioxide (CO2)  emissions (Kelly et al., 2010, p. 13). Furthermore, the EU played a 
progressive role during the discussions on the Kyoto Protocol from 1995 to 1997, where 
the EU proposed the deepest emission cuts (15 percent) and accepted the highest 
reduction target (8 percent) among the industrialised countries (Oberthür, n.d., p. 3). 
 
Considering the above achievements, it is surprising that the EU played a rather 
marginal role during the 2009 Fifteenth Conference of the Parties (COP15) in 
Copenhagen where the international community negotiated a successor climate 
change framework to the Kyoto Protocol which expires in 2012 (Silberberg, 2010, p. 2). 
The essential outcome of these negotiations, the Copenhagen Accord, neither 
conceptually nor substantially reflected the EU’s position (Curtin, 2010, p. 1).  
 
With this in mind, the paper will examine under which conditions the EU is an actor in 
the area of climate change. In doing so, the paper will use the theoretical concept of 
actorness defined here as “the ability to function actively and deliberately in relation 
to other actors in the international system” (Sjöstedt, 1977, p. 16). In order for an 
organisation to be deemed an actor in its own right it must be recognised, 
authoritative,  cohesive and autonomous (Mühleck, 2010, p. 4). The paper will thus 
analyse to what extent these criteria were present in three international climate 
negotiations: 1) the Rio summit, 2) the COP3 in Kyoto and 3) the COP15 in 
                                                 
1 The term “EU” will be used as a simplifier to denote the political entity of the European Union. 
During the analysis, however, which covers different periods of time, the appropriate terms for 
the analysed periods will be used, i.e. “EC” (European Community) for the Rio summit and the 
COP3 and “EC/EU” for the COP15.  
2 The terms “UNCED” and “the Rio summit” are used interchangeably throughout the paper 
to denote this conference. 
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Copenhagen. It will be argued that while the actorness criteria were present at the 
Rio Summit and the COP3 in Kyoto, it was a lack of autonomy and especially 
cohesion which prevented the EU from being an international actor more recently in 
Copenhagen. Moreover, the lack of full actorness at the COP15 coincided with very 
limited goal attainment of the EU, as opposed to the Rio summit and the COP3. In this 
way, the paper shows why the EU’s participation in Rio and Kyoto has come to be 
considered relative successful examples of EU engagement in climate change 
negotiations, while its participation in Copenhagen has been considered more of a 
failure (Brinkhorst, 1994, p. 61; Curtin, 2010, pp. 2-4).  
 
Assessing Actorness 
 
This paper draws upon the conceptualisation of actorness given by Jupille and 
Caporaso. The authors propose four criteria – recognition, authority, autonomy and 
cohesion – for ascertaining the EU’s global political role (Jupille & Caporaso, 1998, p. 
214). Subsequently, a brief description of these four criteria and the indicators utilised 
to measure them will be presented.3    
 
Recognition  
 
The first criterion entails external recognition of the EU by other member states of the 
UNFCCC and third parties such as NGOs. Formal recognition is indicated by 
formulations in treaties and official documents of the UNFCCC conferring legal rights 
and privileges of membership onto the EU delegation (Mühleck, 2010, p. 4). 
Alternatively, recognition may be informal and indicated by behaviour of third 
parties. Third actors (i.e. representatives third countries and/or NGOs) that decide to 
interact with representatives of the EU,4 instead of or in addition to the individual 
member states, implicitly confer informal recognition upon it.  
 
Authority 
 
Authority refers to the EU’s legal competences to act externally in a given area. The 
condition of formal authority is present when the member states, through treaty 
provisions, have delegated legal competence to the EU to act on environmental 
issues. Since EU competence may vary (between exclusive, shared or no 
                                                 
3 For an overview of the indicators, see table 1 in the annex. 
4 Following Groenleer & Van Schaik, representatives of the EU will be understood as officials 
from the Council Presidency and the European Commission (Groenleer & Van Schaik, 2007).  
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competence) it is necessary to establish the consequences of this variation for 
actorness. According to Pedro do Coutto, the more explicit the formal allocation of 
competencies is, the greater the actorness, implying that EU actorness is at its 
strongest when operating under exclusive EU competence (Pedro do Coutto, 2010, p. 
98). 
 
Besides formal authority, informal authority may arise as a result of the Commission’s 
expertise or experience (Groen & Niemann, 2010, p. 7). According to Pollack, 
member states are more likely to delegate competences to the Commission when 
they face a complex policy environment (Pollack, 2006, p. 168; see also Martin, 2006, 
p. 164). Thus, as the negotiations become more technically complex, the expectation 
is that the Commission will gain more authority. 
 
Cohesion  
 
Cohesion is the degree to which an entity is capable of formulating and articulating 
internally consistent policy preferences (Groenleer & Van Schaik, 2007, p. 972). 
Cohesion is threatened by disagreements/conflicts within the entity. For the EU, 
conflicts can take two forms as either horizontal conflicts (between individual 
member states or between EU-level institutions) or vertical conflicts (between the EU 
level and the member state level) (Jupille & Caporaso, 1998, p. 220). The degree of 
disagreements/conflicts within the EU will thus be used as an indicator for cohesion 
where an inverse relationship between the degree of disagreements/conflicts and 
the level of cohesion is expected.  
 
Autonomy 
 
Jupille and Caporaso distinguish between institutional distinctiveness and 
independence from other actors when defining the criterion of autonomy.  
 
Firstly, institutional distinctiveness is determined by the size of the delegation and the 
extent to which the EU has a separate administrative capacity installed at the given 
conference (Huigens & Niemann, 2009, p. 10). Also, in regard to institutional 
distinctiveness it has to be asked who represented the EU at the international climate 
negotiations. As the political saliency of the representatives increase – such as the 
head of state of the country holding the Council Presidency or the Commission 
President – the better the conditions for EU actorness become. 
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Secondly, autonomous action requires the institutions’ ability to act independently 
which, according to Jupille and Caporaso, requires the agent (here the EU) to enjoy 
wide decision-making latitude (Jupille & Caporaso, 1998, p. 218). This will be indicated 
by the strictness of member state control through mechanisms such as intra-EU 
coordination meetings and/or the negotiating mandate.  
 
Analysis of the EU’s Climate Change Actorness 
 
The EC Enters the Environmental Scene in Rio 
 
The participation of the European Community in the Rio summit has been argued to 
represent an important case for understanding the EU’s role in international 
environmental politics (Jupille & Caporaso, 1998, p. 221). An important outcome of 
note from the Rio summit was the adoption of the UNFCCC which represents the 
beginning of the international political response to climate change aimed at 
stabilising concentrations of greenhouse gas emissions (GHGs) (IISD, 2009, p. 2). 
 
Recognition 
Regarding formal recognition, the EC generally enjoys non-voting observer status at 
conferences held within the United Nations (UN) framework (Brinkhorst, 1994, p. 611). 
The EC received additional competences to act in the area of climate change with 
the entry into force of the Single European Act (SEA) in 1986, hence it was felt that 
observer status would not guarantee an effective exercise of its competences and 
the protection of its interests (Brinkhorst, 1994, p. 613).  
 
In the lead-up to the Rio summit the Council, therefore, decided that the EC should 
partake in the summit as a full participant on equal terms with EC member states 
(Sbragia, 1997, p. 26). At a PrepCom meeting before the summit, a dispute arose over 
the exact role that the EC was going to play, as some member states and the USA 
opposed treating then Commission President Jacques Delors as a head of state 
(Jupille & Caporaso, 1998, pp. 222-223). A compromise was thus struck at the end of 
the same meeting and the General Assembly of the UN decided to confer “full 
participant status” onto the EC. This status provided the EC with all the rights of 
participating member states (save voting rights and submitting procedural motions), 
including participation in committees, the right to speak and to reply and to submit 
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proposals and substantive amendments (Brinkhorst, 1994, p. 612). The conferral of “full 
participant status” thus indicates recognition of the EC by the UNCED.  
 
Authority 
Climate change is an area of shared competence between the member states and 
the EC (Damro et al., 2008, p. 183). As a result, agreements decided upon in the 
framework of the UNFCCC are so-called mixed agreements requiring the signature of 
both the Union and the member states (Rhinard & Kaeding, 2006, p. 1024). However, 
the Rio summit did not deal exclusively with environmental issues, but addressed a 
wide range of questions, including official development aid (ODA), biodiversity, forest 
resources and global climate change. As these areas varied according to whether 
the EC enjoyed exclusive or shared competence, the question of who would 
represent the EC was continually raised during the summit (Jupille & Caporaso, 1998, 
pp. 221-222).  
 
Beforehand, the Council sought to bring added clarification to this situation by 
outlining the division of tasks between the EC and the member states. On all issues 
falling within the Community’s exclusive powers, the Commission would present and 
negotiate the common position in consultation with representatives of the member 
states. On matters of mixed competence, the Council Presidency would generally 
express the common position and negotiate accordingly (Sbragia, 1997, p. 28).  
 
Concerning exclusive competence areas, the EC clearly enjoyed authority to act. 
This has been confirmed by then Director-General of DG XI Laurens Jan Brinkhorst who 
argues that in areas where important EC directives had been agreed – such as toxic 
chemicals, waste and fisheries – Commission representatives spoke exclusively on 
behalf of the Community (Brinkhorst, 1994, p. 613).  
 
Outside the area of exclusive competence the EC’s participation in Rio was in 
general more ambiguous. Jupille and Caporaso note how in shared competence 
areas, “the EC’s authority was rarely clear to anyone, including the EC participants 
themselves” (Jupille & Caporaso, 1998, p. 222). The ambiguity of the EC’s position 
likely has to do with the diverse array of issues dealt with at the Rio summit which 
meant a continuously changing legal stature of the EC. Despite the intention of the 
Council to lay out an explicit practical division of labour before the start of the 
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conference, it did not resolve the question of who should negotiate on behalf of the 
EC in the areas of shared competence but left this to be decided on a case-by-case 
basis.  
 
Cohesion  
With regard to horizontal cohesion between the institutions, Brinkhorst notes that the 
Portuguese Presidency cooperated relatively smoothly with Commission 
representatives (Brinkhorst, 1994, p. 613). This cooperation was aided by the Council’s 
division of tasks noted above (Sbragia, 1997,  p. 28). Besides this, a UN General 
Assembly Resolution had asked all participating states to prepare national reports 
before the onset of the conference. The Commission produced a document on 
behalf of all EC member states which provided information regarding the 
Community’s position in the various areas under discussion (Commission of the 
European Communities, 1992). Whether this single document contributed to erasing 
all internal divisions is unlikely. However, it does indicate that there was agreement on 
many important issues and a more cohesive position than would have been the case 
if twelve separate member state documents had been produced.  
 
Despite these signs of cohesion, disagreements were evident beneath the surface 
during negotiations leading up to the Rio summit. The Commission, aiming for the EC 
to take on a leading role in the fight against climate change, proposed an energy 
tax which it hoped would contribute to reducing joint Community CO2 emissions to 
1990 levels by the year 2000 (Porter & Brown, 1996, p. 95). Although, supported by 
some larger member states, the carbon tax was by no means backed up by all and 
indicates some horizontal disagreement. Certain member states opposed it on the 
grounds that it would render their industries uncompetitive compared to the US and 
Japanese industries while Spain argued that it would hinder its economic 
development (Jupille & Caporaso, 1998,  p. 224). The consequences of the 
Commission’s carbon tax proposal was therefore quite damaging for the horizontal 
cohesiveness of the EC. It meant that only Denmark, Germany and the Netherlands 
had concrete plans for reducing CO2 emissions and the EC was left without a 
common policy on this issue (Ringius, 1999, p. 9). 
 
Autonomy 
Regarding institutional distinctiveness, the EC was certainly present at the Rio summit 
with Council representatives, some twenty Commission staff and five members from 
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the European Parliament (EP) among the EC delegation (Jupille & Caporaso, 1998, p. 
223). Nonetheless, the chairperson of the EP Environment Committee, Ken Collins, as 
well as Environment Commissioner, Carlo Ripa di Meana, both decided to stay away 
due to different dissatisfactions with the conference (Sbragia, 1997, p. 28). Moreover, 
owing to the already mentioned objections of the USA and some member states to 
treat Commission President, Jacques Delors, as a head of state during the concluding 
ceremonies, he was unable to deliver his prepared remarks at the conference (Jupille 
& Caporaso, 1998,  pp. 223-224). The institutional distinctiveness of the EU was, 
therefore, relatively weaker than could have been the case. 
 
Despite lacking some distinctiveness, the EC, nevertheless, played quite an 
independent role relative to its members. Sbragia notes that the Council Presidency 
was very active and enjoyed wide decision-making latitude by negotiating on behalf 
of the Community with the G-775 countries while the USA and Russia were passively 
looking on (Sbragia, 1997, p. 28).  
 
Another indication of EC autonomy is the strictness of the mandate given to EC 
negotiators. The EC played an important role in avoiding a breakdown of the 
negotiations surrounding a document of principles on forest management, when the 
EC’s representative was given a broad mandate to negotiate on behalf of the EC. 
This allowed him to craft a document that the participating states could agree to and 
which would, more importantly, act as a basis for a future binding forest convention 
(Brinkhorst, 1994, p. 614).  
 
Summary  
Overall, the EC did display a certain degree of actorness at the Rio summit. All four 
criteria seem to have been present, albeit to varying degrees. Although not 
achieving its original objective of an international agreement on binding reduction 
targets, the Community, nonetheless, managed to leave its mark on the summit 
which – with the signing of numerous important environmental conventions including 
the UNFCCC – “delineated the future ‘playing field’ and defined the basic rules of 
the future game” (Oberthür & Ott, 1999, p. 33).  
 
                                                 
5 The Group of 77 is a coalition of 131 developing countries in the UN system (Maegaard & 
Jensen, 1999, p. 111).  
  10 BRIGG Paper 3/2011 
Big in Japan  
 
The Rio summit represented an important first step in the EU’s actions towards a 
multilateral solution to climate change. The COP3 in Kyoto marked an equally 
significant step forward in the UNFCCC process. The result of this conference was the 
Kyoto Protocol which imposes legally binding commitments to reduce GHGs for 
industrialised countries. Significantly, the Kyoto Protocol thus marked a qualitative shift 
from emission stabilisation to emission reduction (Ringius, 1999, p. 13) and has been 
hailed as the most important international climate change agreement to date 
(Groenleer & Van Schaik, 2007, p. 983). 
 
Recognition 
The legal basis for the Kyoto process was laid with the adoption of the UNFCCC on 9 
May 1992 (Oberthür & Ott, 1999, p. 33). The EC became a party to the international 
climate change regime created by the UNFCCC under the special guise of a 
Regional Economic Integration Organisation (REIO). Even though REIO status is not the 
same as actual statehood, the status conferred onto the EC implies formal 
recognition of legal personality within the UNFCCC (Vogler, 2002, p. 5). 
 
According to Mühleck, informal recognition could be indentified in Kyoto, as other 
states, including the USA and Japan, negotiated with the EC as they would with each 
other (Mühleck, 2010, p. 14). An example of informal recognition by third states took 
place during the final days of the conference when the high-level ministerial meetings 
replaced the officials’ meetings. At earlier COPs the tradition had been to undertake 
the ministerial meetings in a smaller group of countries outside the full membership of 
the UNFCCC known as the “Friends of the Chairman”. The COP3 represented a break 
with this tradition, as the EC (led by the Council Presidency), the USA and Japan 
chose to conduct the final negotiations – including the decision on the countries’ 
reduction targets – separately from the rest of the participants in Kyoto (Maegaard & 
Jensen, 1999, p. 70). Rather than the individual EC member states, it was the EC that 
was included in this group indicating informal recognition as an actor in its own right 
by the world’s two largest industrial countries at the time.  
 
Authority 
Regarding the EC’s formal authority to act at the COP3, it did not change much over 
the years compared to the Rio summit. The 1993 Maastricht Treaty did deepen the 
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SEA’s provisions by adding majority voting and the European Environmental Agency 
as well as an environmental fund for the implementation of certain directives. The 
changes did not, however, affect the EC’s legal competence to act in international 
negotiations compared to earlier (Mühleck, 2010, p. 12), thereby in theory granting 
the EC the same formal authority as in Rio.  
 
An important difference at the COP3 compared to Rio was that the former dealt 
more exclusively with climate change and not the wide array of issues of the latter. 
This meant that in Kyoto there were no exclusive competence areas under discussion. 
In the shared competence area of climate change, the member states decided to 
retain jurisdiction and thereby deny the Commission the possibility of conducting the 
negotiations alone on behalf of the EC (Groenleer & Van Schaik, 2007, p. 985).  
 
Thus, despite in theory possessing the same degree of formal authority as in Rio, in 
practice, the lack of exclusive competence areas at the COP3 meant that the 
Commission was given a more marginal role. Lacasta et al. argue that by refusing to 
grant the Commission a negotiation mandate, the EU’s negotiating capacities are 
considerably weakened (Lacasta et al., 2002, p. 370). By comparison to ozone 
negotiations, where the Commission has been granted negotiating capacities by the 
member states, the authors argue that guidance by the rotating Council Presidency 
hinders a stable process and a medium or long term negotiating strategy (ibid.).  
 
This does not mean that the Commission played no role whatsoever. According to 
one former director of DG Environment, the educational background and technical 
knowledge of certain Commission representatives to advise and assist the Council 
Presidency during the negotiations increased not only the Commission’s credibility but 
also its influence during the negotiations (Interview with former director of DG 
Environment by telephone, 2011). Although the member states decided to retain 
competence at the COP3, thereby denying the Commission formal competences, it 
seems to have enjoyed informal authority, compensating somewhat for its lack of 
formal authority. 
 
Cohesion 
The EC was generally united in striving for a multilateral climate agreement with 
binding reduction commitments. This overall aim included the ambition of setting 
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long-term targets and fixed timetables in any negotiation outcome (Council of the 
European Union, 1997, p. 3). For example, in 1996, leading up to the Kyoto 
conference, the EC published its first significant climate change proposal for the post-
2000 period. The proposal stated that global mean average temperatures should not 
exceed two degrees compared to pre-industrial levels and required significant 
reductions from industrialised countries in the period 2000-2020 (Ringius, 1999, p. 12).   
 
Despite appearing united, there were, however, marked differences within the EC on 
the proposal to limit GHGs. Most apparent were the differences between North and 
South. The Northern countries, consisting of Austria, Denmark, Germany, the 
Netherlands, Sweden and to some extent the UK, acted as the leaders in pushing for 
and adopting environmental policies (Ringius, 1999, p. 17). The Southern countries – 
including Portugal, Spain and Greece along with Ireland – were against limiting GHG 
emissions due to their relatively low level of economic development and low 
administrative capacity (Oberthür & Ott,  1999,  p. 17). Without this internal 
differentiation between member states, it was clear that the EC would be unable to 
reach a common position on adopting a stringent reduction target (Ringius, 1999, p. 
19).  
 
When the Netherlands held the Council Presidency during the first half of 1997, it was 
recognised that internal differentiation of reduction targets was key to reaching a 
common negotiating position (Maegaard & Jensen, 1999, p. 51). At the March 1997 
Environment Council, a burden sharing agreement or “climate bubble” was 
proposed (Vogler, 2002, p. 3). Instead of symmetrical targets across the member 
states, the bubble would require that some countries reduce their GHG emissions, 
others would stabilise their emissions and some would be allowed to increase their 
emissions (Barker et al., 2001, p. 246). Recognising the national energy mixes of 
different member states and the higher GHG reduction potential of some member 
states compared to others, this solution allowed the EC to share the costs of reducing 
its overall GHG emissions and was broadly accepted.  
 
Moreover, the differentiated efforts of the member states allowed the EC to enter the 
COP3 negotiations, calling for a 15 percent emissions reduction target – by 2010 
compared to 1990 levels – for all developed nations (Commission of the European 
Communities, 1997, p. 2). Although the EC ended up agreeing to a considerably 
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lower eight percent target, the ambitious 15 percent aim was, nonetheless, important 
as it could be used as a bargaining chip to pressure the more sceptical industrialised 
countries to accept a binding commitment that would not just stabilise emissions but 
reduce them as well (Ringius, 1999, p. 13).    
 
One participating negotiator has noted the importance of the “climate bubble” for 
its impact on EC cohesion more generally (Interview with former Danish Government 
official by telephone, 2011). Following the Dutch initiative, the EC countries 
increasingly started to back up the common position of ambitious reduction targets. 
Whereas earlier it was not uncommon for the member states to express their own 
position in addition to the common EC position, during the Dutch Presidency the 
member states increasingly began to respect the voice of the Council, thus indicating 
horizontal cohesion (ibid.; see also Jung et al., 2007, p. 239). 
 
Regarding the relationship between the EC level and the member state level, this 
seems to have been relatively unproblematic, too. The Commission and especially 
the EP adopted a very progressive line and strongly supported the 15 percent target 
(Interview with former director of DG Environment by telephone, 2011). It has been 
noted that there were some differences between the smaller and larger member 
states on the issue of “Policies and Measures” (PAMs), where the Commission sided 
with the smaller member states. The Commission, however, managed to formulate a 
mandate for the negotiations on PAMs which convinced the larger member states 
not to veto (Mühleck, 2010, p. 13) and it was thus in this case seen more as a 
mediator promoting cohesion within the EC.  
 
Autonomy 
Concerning institutional distinctiveness of the EC during the COP3, it has been noted 
that the Commission as well as the Luxembourg Council Presidency were weakly 
represented in Kyoto due to relatively small-sized delegations (Interview with former 
director of DG Environment by telephone, 2011). Moreover, neither the Commission 
President nor the head of state of Luxembourg attended the conference. Instead, 
these institutions were represented by the Commissioner for Environment and the 
Environment Minister of Luxembourg, respectively (United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change, 2000).  
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Despite the lack of institutional distinctiveness, the EC was not prevented from acting 
independently. According to Groenleer and Van Schaik, the cohesion of the EC – 
especially towards the end of the COP3 – meant that it was entrusted to rather 
independently strike deals on behalf of the member states (Groenleer & Van Schaik, 
2007, p. 989). This indicates a link between cohesion and autonomy; while autonomy 
seems to initially have been quite limited at the outset of the COP3, as the days in 
Kyoto passed, the increasing unity of the member states increased the EC’s 
independence to act on behalf of the member states.  
 
In other cases, it has been noted, however, that the numerous daily coordination 
meetings of the Council Working Party on International Environmental Issues (WPIEI) – 
requiring consensus6 to produce or modify a negotiating mandate – reduced 
autonomy. Several participants have emphasised that each time the EC addressed a 
new topic, it would take hours of internal negotiations seeking a new mandate and 
taking time that could otherwise have been spent influencing the outcome of the 
negotiations (Interview with former director of DG Environment by telephone, 2011; 
interview with former Danish Government official by telephone, 2011). A case in point 
were the negotiations surrounding the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). Some 
member states firmly opposed the inclusion of the CDM in any final agreement while 
others recognised the possibility of using its inclusion as a bargaining strategy towards 
the USA (Interview with former director of DG Environment by telephone, 2011). In the 
end, the issue was negotiated slowly over night and ultimately meant that the EC was 
unable to coordinate its position, thereby losing influence on the final outcome 
(Yamin, 2000, p. 61).   
 
Summary 
The Kyoto Protocol represented the world’s first legally binding agreement on the 
reduction of GHGs. According to the final outcome of the COP3, the world’s 
industrialised countries agree to reduce their GHG-emissions by 5.2 percent in the 
period 2008-2012 compared to the 1990 level (United Nations, 1998, p. 3). Despite this 
historic achievement, the final outcome of the COP3 by no means reflected all the 
EC’s initial aims. Most notably, its original objective of reaching a 15 percent binding 
reduction target for all developed nations failed (Ringius, 1999, p. 13). That said, the 
                                                 
6 Although decisions may be taken through qualified majority voting (QMV), the norm is to 
decide by consensus (Interview with former director of DG Environment by telephone, 2011). 
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Kyoto Protocol implied a compromise for all major developed states. Thus, the EC’s 
concessions meant that the USA was pressured to go beyond emission stabilisation 
and commit itself to a seven percent binding emission reduction target (United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 2007, p. 8). Although the US 
would later withdraw from the Kyoto Protocol in 2001 (Greenpeace, 2001), at the time 
of signing, Ringius argued that “the Kyoto target came closer to the EC position than 
that of the US” (Ringius, 1999, p. 13).  
 
This success of the EC was achieved through a relatively high degree of actorness in 
Kyoto with all four criteria being present to some extent. However, what seems to 
stand out compared to earlier, is the greater willingness of the member states to let 
the EC play an important role at the COP3. Thus, EC cohesion was not as fragile as in 
Rio, and in many cases the unity that the EC showed in Kyoto was noteworthy and 
ultimately contributed to the conference’s historic outcome.  
 
Cracks in EU Actorness Begin to Show 
 
Despite meticulous preparations, and bringing together almost 120 of the world’s 
leaders to provide the political push necessary to launch a new “global climate 
change order”, the COP15 has by many been argued to be a failure, as it did not 
achieve its main goal of a post-Kyoto framework agreement (Egenhofer & Georgiev, 
2009, p. 1). This holds especially for the EC/EU7, which did not manage to repeat its 
success from Kyoto and push for binding cuts in CO2 emissions (Curtin, 2010, p. 1). This 
can be seen as somewhat surprising as – similar to Kyoto – the EC/EU approached 
the COP15 with a very ambitions strategy. The EC/EU proposed to unilaterally cut its 
emissions by 20 percent by 2020 compared to the 1990 level and potentially raise 
these cuts to 30 percent if other industrialised nations would commit to comparable 
targets (Laurent & Le Cacheux, 2010, p. 8). Nonetheless, the Copenhagen Accord 
includes no binding targets and more generally fails to achieve many of the EC/EU’s 
original aims (Curtin, 2010, p. 4).  
 
Recognition  
The EC/EU was recognised at the COP15 to possess REIO membership of the UNFCCC, 
indicating a comparable level of formal recognition as at the COP3. One important 
                                                 
7 Although, the Lisbon Treaty abolishes the distinction between the EC and the EU, the 
Treaty’s provisions had not taken effect during the COP15. To avoid misunderstandings the 
term “EC/EU” will therefore be used in this part of the analysis (Groen & Niemann, 2010, p. 14). 
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difference of the COP15 compared to earlier conferences was that it invited heads of 
state to take the final decisions (Groen & Niemann, 2010, p. 10). Before the arrival of 
the heads of state, the negotiations would unfold at the negotiator level,8 followed 
by negotiations between the participating states’ environmental ministers, which 
under previous COPs had constituted the highest decision-making level.  
                                                
 
When looking at the EC/EU’s informal recognition, it is thus necessary to distinguish 
between the different levels of decision-making, as different dynamics were present 
at the ministerial and negotiator levels compared to the head of state level. With 
regard to the lower levels, there seems to have been considerable informal 
recognition of the EC/EU by third states and third actors. It has been noted by 
participant-observers that third states saw the EC/EU as an actor in its own right with 
the competence to negotiate on behalf of its member states. As one Commission 
official noted, although the role of the Swedish Environment Minister changed over 
the course of the COP15, during the initial phases he very clearly spoke on behalf of 
the EC/EU (Interview with Commission official by telephone, 2011). Also, regarding 
interaction, it was observed that third states would approach the Commission or the 
Council Presidency directly rather than go to individual member states (ibid.).  
 
NGOs likewise seem to have recognised and interacted with both Commission 
representatives and the Council Presidency during the preparatory phases. One NGO 
representative noted that the EC/EU was certainly seen as an actor in its own right on 
par with the member states. Accordingly, both formal and informal meetings 
between the EC/EU and the NGOs would regularly take place during the COP15 
(Interview with NGO employee by telephone, 2011).  
 
As the heads of state entered the negotiations towards the end of the conference, 
the level of informal recognition decreased due to the increased political salience of 
negotiations compared to the preparatory level.  
 
From having been the primary external face of the EC/EU – through the Swedish 
Environment Minister – the Council Presidency was increasingly marginalised, as the 
 
8 Negotiations at the negotiator level were divided into two tracks: 1) the “Ad Hoc Working 
Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action under the Convention” (LCA-track) and 2) the “Ad 
Hoc Working Group on further Commitments for Annex 1 Parties under the Kyoto Protocol” 
(KP-track) (Watanabe et al., 2008, p. 2). 
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Swedish Prime Minister, Fredrik Reinfeldt, experienced difficulties in representing the 
E C / E U .  A l t h o u g h  h e  d i d  s u c c e e d  i n  s p e a k i n g  o n  b e h a l f  o f  t h e  U n i o n  i n  s o m e  
instances, he was often overruled by the German, French and UK leaders, Angela 
Merkel, Nicolas Sarkozy and Gordon Brown, respectively. At this stage, third parties 
would no longer approach the Council Presidency as the representative of the EC/EU 
but would instead negotiate with the three larger member states (Groen & Niemann, 
2010, p. 13).  
 
Moreover, according to one Commission official attending the COP15, despite the 
presence of Commission President Manuel Barroso at the meetings of heads of state, 
this does not seem to have improved the EC/EU’s informal recognition by third actors 
(Interview with Commission official of DG Environment by telephone, 2011). Leaked 
audio recordings of a decisive round of informal negotiations between approximately 
25 of the world’s leaders – including the US, China and Brazil – confirm that it was the 
leaders of the three large member states that were negotiating on behalf of the 
EC/EU rather than Barroso or Reinfeldt (Der Spiegel online International, 2010). 
 
Authority  
Like in Kyoto, the EC/EU’s formal authority was limited in that the member states in 
Copenhagen decided to retain competence to negotiate, letting the Council 
Presidency coordinate and present the EC/EU position rather than the Commission 
(Lacasta et al., 2002, p. 369). One important change compared to the COP3, 
however, was the composition of the troika at the COP15. Concerned with EU 
performance in external affairs, the member states in 2001 decided to enlarge the 
formal competences of the Commission by officially integrating it into the troika at the 
expense of the previous Council Presidency (Birkel, 2009, pp. 64-65). Although the 
troika still operates within the constraints of a mandate decided by consensus (Groen 
& Niemann, 2010, p. 15), the increased role of the troika on climate change issues 
(Oberthür, 2009, pp. 14-15), nevertheless, meant that the Commission did possess 
increased authority in representing the EU externally compared to Kyoto.   
 
Also, through informal authority, it was quickly recognised by the member states that 
the very technical nature of the negotiations required negotiators with the necessary 
expertise on the issues under discussion. According to one Commission official, the 
two-track negotiations in Copenhagen between LCA- and KP-negotiations allowed 
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for a division of labour between the Council Presidency and the Commission 
(Interview with Commission official of DG Environment by telephone, 2011). Groen 
and Niemann note that the Commission was chosen to lead the negotiations on the 
KP-track since these negotiations concerned accepted EC/EU policy that had been 
transposed into binding legislation and in which the Commission therefore possessed 
the most expertise (Groen & Niemann, 2010, pp. 17-18).  
 
Another factor that promoted the Commission’s informal authority in Copenhagen 
was the introduction – with the 2004 Irish Presidency – of issue leaders and lead 
negotiators. These negotiators consist of member state and Commission officials 
which are assigned to represent the EC/EU in international negotiations on behalf of 
the Council Presidency. According to Oberthür and Kelly, the negotiators have 
acquired a leading role in representing the EC/EU’s external climate policy (Oberthür 
& Kelly, 2008, p. 38). This has happened by taking over tasks of the Presidency and the 
WPIEI during the preparatory negotiations as well as being increasingly responsible for 
the preparation of the official statements of the COP negotiations (ibid.). In 
Copenhagen the Commission occupied a considerable number of these positions 
with one national official estimating that one in five negotiators were Commission 
officials (Interview with Danish Government official by telephone, 2011).  
 
Despite this relatively high degree of informal authority of the EC/EU at the 
preparatory level, the situation changed at the head of state level. As already 
mentioned, in an informal meeting between a select number of heads of state, the 
representatives of the EC/EU, including Barroso and Reinfeldt, were sidelined (Der 
Spiegel online International, 2010). Although the troika was supposed to speak on 
behalf of the EC/EU in such informal negotiating settings, it was the leaders of 
Germany, France and the UK who negotiated with third parties (Der Spiegel, 2010). 
Thus, at this stage of the negotiations, the Commission’s expertise and experience 
had no effect on its informal authority.  
 
Cohesion  
Regarding horizontal cohesion between the member states, there was an overall 
shared goal of an ambitious climate agreement in Copenhagen. Both the individual 
member states and the Commission agreed that the EC/EU should take on a 
leadership role in Copenhagen and that the main outcome should be an agreement 
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on how to proceed after 2012 when the Kyoto Protocol’s first commitment period 
ends (Groen & Niemann, 2011, p. 10).  
 
Despite this show of unity on the surface there were numerous issues on which 
horizontal differences between the member states were present.  
 
Firstly, there was the question of how large emission reduction targets the EC/EU 
should commit to. The Commission’s “Energy and Climate package” (2008) called for 
the EC/EU to unilaterally strive for a 20 percent reduction in emissions, rising to 30 
percent if other developed countries followed suit (Laurent & Le Cacheux, 2010, p. 8). 
This aim remained controversial, however, and did not enjoy widespread agreement 
among the member states. Especially Poland and Italy opposed setting the 
conditional target so high (Interview with NGO employee by telephone, 2011). This 
opposition was quietly supported by a host of other member states, including 
Bulgaria, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and Slovakia (The Times, 2008). The 30 
percent figure was backed by the UK, France and Germany (Interview with NGO 
employee by telephone, 2011). Since the EC’s mandate did not further specify 
conditions to be fulfilled in order for the EC/EU to commit to the 30 percent reduction, 
the horizontal differences on this issue were left to be solved during the COP15, 
thereby taking valuable time and effort from negotiations with third parties.  
 
A second issue which was a cause of internal differences concerned land use, land 
use change and forestry (LULUCF). LULUCF is an emission sector under the Kyoto 
Protocol covering forest management in developed countries (Greenpeace, 2001). 
Nations with large timber industries – including Sweden, Finland and Austria (Interview 
with Danish Government official by telephone, 2011) – wanted to protect their 
domestic industries, which prevented the EC/EU from finding a common position and 
an explicit negotiating mandate on this issue (Interview with Commission official of DG 
Environment by telephone, 2011).  
 
Thirdly, horizontal differences were present between the newer and older member 
states about what should be done with the unused Assigned Amount Units (AAU) 
during the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol. Since Eastern European 
countries have a surplus of AAUs (Guardian.co.uk, 2009), they were in favour of letting 
unused AAUs be carried over into a new commitment period, whereas more 
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progressive countries such as the UK, Sweden, Denmark and the Netherlands were 
against this possibility (Groen & Niemann, 2011, p. 12). Once again disagreements 
were reflected in the negotiating mandate leaving the position of the EU on this topic 
unanswered (Council of the European Union, 2009, p. 15). Moreover, during the 
negotiations, a group of seven Eastern European countries released a statement 
calling for the possibility that unused AAUs could be transferred to a post-2012 
agreement. The statement was formulated outside the framework of the EC/EU and 
directly contradicted comments made by the Environment Commissioner, Stavros 
Dimas, during the conference (Guardian.co.uk, 2009).  
 
Finally, the topic of climate funding for developing countries for mitigation and 
adaptation purposes split newer and older member states. While the former were 
reluctant to donate, fearing that they would be forced to contribute more than they 
could afford (EurActiv.com, 2009), the UK, Germany, France, Sweden and Denmark 
were ready to go as far as to propose concrete amounts of financial aid. Again the 
negotiating mandate was formulated ambiguously and a financing agreement 
between the member states could not be reached in time for the negotiations in 
Copenhagen (Groen & Niemann, 2011, p. 12). 
 
Although the most notable differences existed horizontally between member states to 
the detriment of EC/EU cohesion, there were also certain disagreements between the 
EC/EU level and the member state level. This primarily concerned the fact that the 
Commission was one of the most vocal supporters of an agreement with binding 
reduction targets (Interview with Commission official of DG Environment, 2011). For the 
same reasons as noted above in regard to the division between progressive and 
reluctant member states, the latter would not always back the Commission’s stance. 
Especially Poland and Estonia – both heavily reliant on coal as an energy source – 
would on several occasions publicly disagree with the Commission over the amount 
of carbon emissions that they could emit (New York Times, 2009).  
 
Autonomy  
Regarding the EC/EU’s institutional distinctiveness, the Commission was relatively well 
represented at the COP15 with its own expert team occupying a considerable share 
of lead negotiator and issue leader positions (Interview with Danish Government 
official by telephone, 2011). Also, the Commission brought its own media service 
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which conducted press conferences and released statements on its behalf. This was 
the case, too, for the Swedish Presidency, which had a separate Communications 
Secretariat responsible for coordinating communication activities during the 
conference (Groen & Niemann, 2010, p. 29).  
 
Regarding the political standing of the EC/EU representatives, both the Commission 
President and the Swedish Prime Minister attended the COP15 (IISD, 2009, p. 27). This 
ought to have been a boost to the institutional distinctiveness of the EU, as it added 
political weight to the EC/EU’s negotiations with third parties. However, the 
attendance of heads of state at the COP15 undermined the statuses of Barroso and 
Reinfeldt. During the final negotiations in the select group of approximately 25 heads 
of state, neither seems to have enjoyed any political weight of note and they were 
rather overlooked by the larger EC/EU member states (Der Spiegel online 
International, 2010).  
 
Despite some institutional distinctiveness of EC/EU-institutions, this did not coincide 
with practical independence of EC/EU institutions at the COP15. Owing to the vague 
Council mandate and overall lack of cohesion, EC/EU representatives could only 
proceed rather cautiously during negotiations and were prevented from going 
ahead independently without having received specific acceptance from the 
member state governments (Groen & Niemann, 2010, p. 30). The politicised issues 
meant that the member states wanted to keep a close eye on EC/EU negotiators 
and, according to one Commission official, “the member states would often try to 
micromanage” the process (Interview with Commission official of DG Environment, 
2011).  
 
An example of the negative impact of this rigidity was the failure of the EC/EU to 
adapt its negotiation strategy as the COP15 progressed. As mentioned above, it 
initially proposed an ambitious strategy consisting of a conditional 30 percent 
reduction target which was intended to galvanise the support of other developed 
countries for similar targets (Curtin, 2010, p. 3). It quickly became clear that important 
developed and developing countries, including the USA and China, were neither 
prepared nor able to follow the lead of the EC/EU in this case (JP.dk, 2010). Although 
a change in strategy at this point would have been wise, it was unlikely due to the 
lack of cohesion and the consensus requirement in the WPIEI. The effects of this 
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inflexibility were seen during the final stages of the negotiations when the EC/EU was 
sidelined while the USA, China, India, Brazil and South Africa negotiated the main 
elements of what came to be known as the Copenhagen Accord (Politico, 2009). The 
outcome – which neither conceptually nor substantially reflected the EC/EU’s position 
(Curtin, 2010, p. 2) – indicates that the EC/EU’s independence to make a difference in 
negotiations with third parties was severely limited.  
 
Summary  
The EC/EU’s actorness was more circumscribed in Copenhagen compared to the 
previous cases. Whereas Kyoto was characterised by a strong member state 
willingness to let the EC/EU play a role, the opposite was true in Copenhagen. The 
lack of cohesiveness and its adverse effects for autonomy have been especially 
harmful for EC/EU actorness. Furthermore, the uniqueness of the COP15 in inviting 
heads of state for the first time, did not help the EC/EU’s cause either, since “the 
arrival of 115 Heads of State and Government in Copenhagen changed the 
dynamics and routine of the negotiations” (IISD, 2009, p. 28). Rather than providing 
the political push necessary to launch a new “global climate change order” 
(Egenhofer & Georgiev, 2009, p. 1), the inclusion of this decision-making level had a 
negative impact on EC/EU actorness.  
 
Conclusion 
 
This paper has analysed EU actorness in the area of climate change. In the cases 
studied there is no example of an ideal-type situation of all four criteria being 
completely present across all the negotiations at one conference. This reflects the 
difficulties of attempting to give an overall assessment of actorness for a complex 
multilateral conference involving many different negotiating sessions with the majority 
of the world’s nations participating.9  
 
Recognising this, the EU did come closest to the ideal-type situation for all four criteria 
at the COP3 and to some extent also at the Rio summit. Whereas the Rio Summit and 
the COP3 contributed to stabilising and reducing GHG emissions, respectively, the 
COP15 – although possibly not the failure that some claim – was, nonetheless, a 
                                                 
9 For a similar conclusion on the difficulties of giving unequivocal assessments of EU actorness, 
see Huigens & Niemann (2009). 
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disappointment considering the EU’s ambitious targets set out beforehand. Therefore, 
the lack of full actorness at the COP15 coincided with very limited goal attainment of 
the EU. The paper shows why the EU’s participation in the Rio summit and the COP3 
have come to be considered relative successful examples of EU engagement in 
climate change negotiations, while its participation in the COP15 has been 
considered a disappointment (Brinkhorst, 1994, p. 61; Curtin, 2010, pp. 2-4). 
 
Interestingly, however, the EU did not lack all the actorness criteria in Copenhagen, 
since it enjoyed both recognition and authority. Thus, it was the EU’s recent loss of 
cohesion and autonomy that impaired the EU’s actorness. Furthermore, the 
observation that autonomous action often followed from cohesion suggests that the 
lack of cohesion was especially detrimental for EU actorness. This finding on the 
importance of cohesion corroborates earlier findings which also show how cohesion 
was an especially important criterion for EU actorness (Groenleer & Van Schaik, 2007; 
Groen & Niemann, 2011). As Lacasta et al. also note, “without the EU’s collective 
‘weight’ individual Member States’ interests might simply not be able to prevail on the 
negotiating arena in the face of such sizeable negotiating partners as the US, Japan, 
China or Brazil” (Lacasta et al., 2002, p. 368). 
 
Although the paper has established the conditions for actorness, it should only be 
seen as a first step. The factors conditioning actorness have, for example, not been 
examined. In this regard the findings do suggest a number of factors that could have 
causal relevance for the EU’s ability to act in the area of international climate 
change negotiations. 
 
Firstly, the dividing line within the EU during the COP15 was shown to be primarily 
between a group of older and newer member states. This contributed to disuniting 
the EU in Copenhagen and indicates that the enlargements in 2004 and 2007 may 
have affected the EU’s ability to form a common position.  
 
Secondly, the combination of inviting heads of state to attend the COP15 for the first 
time ever and the politicised nature of the negotiations did not facilitate the 
establishment of a common position within the EU and much less so between all the 
participating states at the conference.  
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Finally, the importance of certain developing countries cannot be underestimated 
either. In Kyoto it was observed that the main actors were primarily the EU, the USA 
and to some extent Japan (Maegaard & Jensen, 1999, p. 70). More recently, a host 
of developing countries – including the BASIC countries (Brazil, South Africa, India, and 
China) – have become more influential environmental actors, which is likely to render 
the EU’s ability to act in the fight against climate more contested (Groen & Niemann, 
2010, p. 8). Without representing an exhaustive list of potential reasons, these factors 
have been noticed during the analysis as potentially contributing to diminish the 
actorness of the EU and could therefore demand further exploration in future 
research on EU actorness. 
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ANNEX I 
Table 1: Indicators of actorness criteria 
 
Criteria   Definition  Indicators  Consequences of indicators for EU actorness   
Recognition 
 
 
 
The extent to which 
the EU possesses 
formal and informal 
recognition in 
negotiations by 
third actors  
Formal Recognition 
- Legal status of the EU within the UNFCCC 
 
Informal Recognition  
- Do other members of the UNFCCC and 
NGOs recognise the EU by interacting with it? 
 
Full participant status or REIO-status accorded to the EU results 
in more actorness (compared to observer status for instance)  
 
Evidence of third-country or NGO interaction with the EU 
indicates actorness. 
Authority   The extent to which 
the EU has legal 
competence to act 
on environmental 
issues 
Formal authority 
- Do the member states delegate authority to 
the EU’s institutions? 
 
Informal authority 
- Does the EU enjoy authority beyond that 
deriving from law, for example through 
Commission expertise?  
 
Exclusive competence results in more actorness compared to 
shared competence. Shared competence results in more 
actorness compared to no competence. 
 
The greater the asymmetrical knowledge between member 
states and the Commission, the greater EU actorness.  
Cohesion   The extent to which 
the EU exhibits 
cohesion 
 
Horizontal cohesion  
- Do differences between member states or 
between EU institutions exist? 
 
Vertical cohesion  
- Do differences between the EU level and 
member state level exist? 
 
Relatively less horizontal and vertical conflicts result in more EU 
actorness.  
 
Autonomy   The extent to which 
the EU can operate 
independently from 
individual member 
states 
 
 
Institutional distinctiveness 
- Does the EU have a distinctive institutional 
apparatus within the UNFCCC in relation to 
other member states and third actors? 
 
- Did the EU send visible representatives to the 
UNFCCC (Commission President/head of 
state of country holding Council Presidency)?  
 
Independence 
- Did EU negotiators enjoy wide decision-
making latitude? 
 
 
The larger and more elaborate the EU institutional apparatus 
within the conferences is, the better the conditions for 
autonomous EU action.  
 
The more politically salient the figures sent to attend the 
conferences are, the more institutional distinctiveness and 
thereby actorness of the EU. 
 
Degree of control the member states exercise through 
mechanisms, such as intra-EU coordination meetings and the 
negotiating mandate. Wider decision-making latitude will 
follow from fewer coordination meetings and/or a more flexible 
negotiating mandate.  
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